



Examining the Dynamics of Political Co-Option under Ayub Khan's Regime

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Abstract:

Military in Pakistan is the most autonomous political actor capable of influencing political change. This study endeavors the patterns of military co-option in Pakistan with the objectives of understanding its dynamics, its impact on the polity and military itself. It also examines the techniques adopted by military regimes of General Ayub and the work of political influence by the military dictators from the sidelines and the problems of the different political parties that alliances with military regime. This article focuses on discussing the politics of co-option under Ayub Khan Regime. This study also explores significant nature and dynamics of politics of co-option and the reasons behind adopting the politics of co-option by the military regimes. This study also helps political actors, policy makers, military regimes, and legislators in understanding the deep advantages and disadvantages of politics of co-option to formulate better policies as a result. This work deals with politics of co-option under military regimes in Pakistan. So, this study is an attempt to fill this gap. As a pioneer study it paves the way and facilitates future researchers to develop new research models for the understanding of issues related to politics of co-option.

Keywords: Ayub Khan, basic democracy, dictatorship, elections, military, politics of co-option

INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of Pakistan as sovereign and independent state, the Pakistan military tried to affect politics of the country to such an extent that the institution would establish itself as most powerful stakeholder of the polity. It was a systematic move and mechanism where the Pakistan military got supersaver and in this way the institution's influence tremendously increased. Resultantly, Pakistan's political system remained fractured and faced four full fledged military rule

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and ever-increasing interruption since the creation of this country (Hamid, 1999). After the abrogation of the parliament on October 24th, 1954, by Ghulam Muhammad second Governor General of Pakistan, the contemporary political scene in Pakistan was beset with a constitutional crisis. It was claimed by Ayub later that it was offered to him by Ghulam Muhammad to take over the government at his juncture but due to his firm belief in the political neutrality of the armed forces he refused to do so. The military intervention in the civil administration, the continuation of the declaration on 6th March 1953 of Lahore's Martial Law to control the Anti-Ahmadiya riots were the most dramatic and fateful. Indeed, in this political crisis the mode of gradual involvement of military was symptomatic of the organizational autonomy of army (Waseem 2007, 95-7). Thus, any particular policy was not assumed by Ayub government for more national capability of military. Although the participation in the military was demanded in 1958 by Bengali for both vociferous and numerous. Bengali burden assortment as of changing navel general sectors to East-Pakistan rise an independent Bengali paramilitary for the purposes of defense of the East Pakistan (Baxter 1988, 236).

Ayub Khan in 1958 warranted the takeover for the purpose of rescuing the country from disorder which then became a norm. Pre 1958 phase was fallout of the situation through which Pakistan faced national partition and ideological as well as organizational and safety dilemma (Talbot 1999, 118). All consist of innocence, insufficient organizational workers, a huge person in exile dilemma, broke financial income, local clashes, and turn down of the Muslim League. They finally created the reasons of the downfall of parliamentary system, complete failure of the democratic leadership to give an operation civilian rule through increasing compromise, and whole unresponsiveness of the elites headed for the peoples and their crisis (Kukreja 1985, 50).

Ayub Khan materialized his trance by launching a coup abrogating constitution and through imposition of Martial Law and after that he moved towards consolidating his dictatorial rule. General Ayub first broadcasted to the nation, on 8th October 1958, in which he justified the imposition of Martial Law. He presumed authority with a schema for -financial transformation and polity reformation. After taking control Ayub mercilessly goes for humiliating towards antagonism. He affirmed democratic gathering as discordant services and politicians as dishonest, egotistical, and lacking ability; and guilty for unsteadiness in state and its freedom (Sayeed 1980, 54).

BASIC DEMOCRACIES

There were two purposes for the expansion of influence of military regime to mass population in 1959. First purpose was to allow people to participate at local level, but they were not allowed to participate on state level, and the local bodies used it as an instrument for legitimizing regime (Khan, 2012). Promotion of Ayub at the rank on Field-Marshal and Basic Democracies Order of 27th of October 1959 concurred to each other. All aspects of Pakistani life were intended to be merged by Basic Democracies. It was a tool to bring together the different sectors of society and to blend the skills of the commons and sophisticated ones. Basic Democracies envisaged an integrative system of operative representative bodies that functioned without resort to political parties. Basic Democracies was more apolitical in form and their function was to make ordinary people feel the need for their own development. Although Basic Democracies was a political, but it was also an initiative into the grassroots of economic and social reforms. Basic Democracies, Ayub noted, acknowledge the need to a contemporary situation. It aimed to supply undemanding opportunities

for self-growth and heightened awareness. Where in village citizens facilitate their desires also determined their differences.

The highest levels of government, and Basic Democracies were too superior national identity by connecting towns and villages in a network of tiered grouping. Basic Democracies employ an executive formation long in place, and in fact, to the colonial period in some ways it delineated a throwback. The villages would resolve their entity desires between their own instant element although it was believed, the system was dependent on the services restricted to the assets that were circulated between the units, and whose familiarity was necessary in all matters away from that of the simplest daily chores (Ziring,1997, 254-55). At the lowest level basic democracies were brought into being to do a meticulous job, the job of running the management. A new equivalence with administrative system, for the country relationship, it has given the people logic of liability (Suleri 1946, 179). The basic democracies structure consisted of four tiers. They are divided by country into member's eighty thousand constituencies with a population of 1,000 to 1,200 people. For the best representatives Ayub Khan requested his countryman to vote for this purpose given their first major tasks by 23 January 1960 the 80,000 Basic Democracies had been chosen. The system on ten constituencies was grouped collectively to form the lowest ring. The Union Council in rural areas was known as the lowest level. Along with that there was a Town Committee in small towns. Official and unofficial members were nominated, the elected members. Local government's next step was tehsil. Union Councils Chairman was included in Town Committee and Official members. At the sub-divisional levels official members consist of the representatives of state structure sections. Tehsildar was head of the council of Sub-Divisional Officer/Assistant Commissioner. Local government for urban areas was the second step exceeding the population of 14, 000, was the Municipal Committees alternatively of Tehsil Councils (Nisa & Ahsan, 2022).

The Municipal Committees were presiding above by an Official Chairman. In Cantonments the second tier was known as the Cantonment Board. In all cases the district council is third level. It consisted of elected members and the official members (representative of nation-building department at the district level). Each chairman to elect its members of the Union Council/Union Committees/Town Committees constituted Electoral College. The Deputy Commissioner presided over by the district council. In the Basic Democracies Structure fourth tier was the divisional Council that consisted of official and non-official members. Divisional Councils were elected seats filled by the representatives of the Municipal Committees, these bodies were elected by the elected members in cantonment board and the district council. In the divisional council over the meeting by Commissioner presided. In these institutions participation of the bureaucrats was crucial. The government wanted to keep these institutions under her wings and created an impression so that their votes in the elections could be secured by Ayub regime. Basic Democracies identified with the Ayub regime (Rizvi, 2000).

The Basic Democracies structure provided the military government sufficient self-belief to hunt for approval of its strategy from Basic Democracies member. The merits of the new system were considered as a preface and an enormous propaganda campaign was launched. Powerful people and Basic Democracies members were contacted by the cabinet members through speeches. West Pakistan undertook a tour by Ayub Khan and at every station he spoke to public gatherings only about the success and the importance of his rule and about the experiments of new system of Basic

Democracies. Ayub Khan visited East Pakistan and met the Peoples from 21 to 29 January 1960. On 14 February 1960 a presidential referendum was dramatic. In the form of marking 'yes' or 'no' on ballot papers the elected Basic Democracies components were requested to articulate their assurance on Ayub. Elected Basic Democracies members out of 79,850, 78,730 threw their ballots. 75,293 votes came in his basket with 95.6 pc of the totaled ballots and 2,819 balloted in opposition with the percentage of 3.6, and 608 ballots were proclaimed unacceptable. After three days, Ayub Khan the first elected President was sworn on 17th February 1960 (Rizvi, 2000). He announced the appointment of the constitution commission on the same day.

On 1 March 1962 a fresh constitution publicized by Ayub. The Electoral College consisted of the members of Basic Democracies fixed indirect method of elections for the candidates of lower house of the state and for the assemblies of provenances in 1962 constitution. Public meetings or processions were not allowed to candidates as a substitute, 598 meetings in East Pakistan arranged by election commission and three hundred and two meetings during 12-27 April in West Pakistan with the intention that the voters (Basic Democracies members) could be addressed by national and provincial assemblies (Rizvi, 2000).

The second step of Ayub's status quo strategy had to utilize this Basic Democracies system as an electoral college for election of President. At the presidential election, in the national assembly the non-supported group produced themselves into a grouping with the name of Combined Opposition Parties (C.O.P). The main interest of the elections was centered on the presidential candidates. President Ayub decided the presidential pattern for that aim to provide an immovability of regimes and a unifying and rallying point to a country which is bodily separated by distance of a thousand miles. There are those who argue against this system, not without cogency of sincerity and reasoning of purpose. The peculiar situation of Pakistan calls for a parliamentary system they maintain because it fulfills the basic needs of the country. Eastern and western sides were to be given a sense of power sharing and equal participation so that the authority is not to be considered as being under rule of president who belongs to one province (Suleri 1946, 179). COP was basically a six-party opposition alliance formed under the leadership of Fatima Jinnah. It included Council Muslim League of Khawaja Nazamuddin and Mumtaz Daultan; Jamat-e-Islami, under Maulana Maududi; the NAP, under Muolana Bhashani; another same naming party NAP, of Wali Khan; and Nizam-a-Islam Party of Chaudhary Mohammad Ali; and Awami League, under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman (Awan, 2014). On the behalf of the COP and due to the influence of Choudhury Muhammad Ali, Fatima Jinnah emerged as a candidate for the office of the president. Known as Madr-e-Millat, she was warmly welcomed by the people and the presidential election was turned into an important event as she was the one who brought the disadvantages and limitations of Ayub's rule to the limelight.

In the country elections had turned on personalities rather than on a programme, more so in a residential election, but with this important difference that whereas Fatimah Jinnah represented political revival, for the maintenance of rule by the civil military –bureaucracy Ayub Khan stood. The regime had also come in for a good deal of criticism for its suspected failure in foreign policy in view of the immense arms load to India made by the West following the China India war of 1962. There was frustration over Kashmir after hopes had been rekindled by Sheikh Abdullah's visit to Pakistan in 1964 to these developments we shall presently turn. Fatimah Jinnah took up all these

issues and lashed out against the regime in a countrywide campaign. Although the voter comprised a mere 80,000 Basic Democracies' and there were restrictions on public meetings, she drew enormous crowds. The system of Basic Democracies had alienated rather than brought the people closer to the regime. Thus, it was that when Fatimah Jinnah rebuked Ayub Khan's government there was a turbulent reaction from the citizens as she articulated their feelings. The result of the election showed Field Marshal Ayub Khan got 49,647 votes. Miss Fatimah Jinnah got 28,345 votes. Fatima Jinnah might well have obtained more votes but for the silence of Bhashani, the inherent limitations of an heterogeneous alliance, and the fact that the tribal votes virtually constituted a pocket borough. Ayub Khan's victory no doubt marked the high watermark of his authority and he proceeded henceforth with renewed self-assurance (Yusuf, 1999).

CONVENTION MUSLIM LEAGUE (CON. ML)

The Convention Muslim League, the spilt part of the old Muslim League, has certainly gained by organization with the president King Party. Ayub Khan pressed his adviser to organize a separate political party for him. He was not happy with their suggestion; they allowed them to establish the party, but he was not happy with their suggestion because of these party support programme and policies of government. The ministerialists, as Ayub Khan's supporters were commonly referred to, first considered the idea of forming a completely new, broad-based national party, but then abandoned this idea in favor of taking control of the former PML. It was for this reason that they won over Manzare Alam when he initiated moves to revive PML in July, after he had consulted leading West Pakistani Leaguers, including Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana and Sardar Bahadur Khan (Nawa-e-waqt, 1962).

A convention to hold now decided by ministerialists; and legal complications to avoid, they called it the League, convention. The decision to this effect was taken formally at a meeting, held on 16 August federal cabinet presided over by Ayub Khan. Someone who made desperate attempts by Ayub Khan, in presiding over the convention, would be capable to the control of assurance of preponderance of the Leagues, for this purpose those included approached: Raja Aamir of Mahmudabad was friendly associate of Quaid; Moulana Akram and Moulana Ihtisham, a famous leader of the jamiatal-Ulma-i-Islam but to accept the offer they all refused. At last, selected to chair the convention for Choudhury Khaliq al-Zaman, this decision was not very formulated he had practically retired from political life after his unsuccessful presidentship of the PML during 1949-50; and, considering his age, was least suited to guide any all-Pakistan party effectively.

The convention met below the chairmanship of Choudhury Khaliq al Zamanat Karachi on September 4-5, 1962, and nearly eight hundred delegates, out of a total of one thousand invited, took part in its deliberations. The thirty delegates from Karachi served as the reception committee with Nawab Yamin Khan as its chairman and Manzare 'Alam as its general secretary. The seven members steering committee, of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Muhammad Ali Bogra, Husain Imam, Abdal Ghafur Hoti Khawaja Ahsan al Din Sheikh Khurshid Ahmad and Ghias al Din Pathan also functioned as the subject committee (Afzal 1987, 56). Section 18 and 42, providing for the continued existence of committee as well as the lower house panels until the configuration of new, were altered mostly to abolish existing committee in sort to avoid other leaguers for using revived it to rival party. Stipulation was prepared for six places of work and holder closed by council: president, vice President, general secretary, treasurer, and two joint secretaries, ministers, deputy ministers,

parliamentary secretaries and additional those had not been parts of several primary stem of League for at least one-year could not clasp office in party. This condition was determined to negate the blame that the principle of the fresh gathering group probable in hand of ministers. This council could amend the constitution by a two third majority.

The East and West Pakistan branches of the party were to have equal representation on the twelve-member central parliamentary board (Ayoob,1971). The functioning groups comprised of thirty component chosen League head plus the central bureau –bearers as ex-officio members. Each provincial League council was to draw up its own constitution to determine its organizational structure. It was to organize branches in every district and city, which after their affiliation to the central party, would be deemed to be branches of the ConML. Once every three years, each branch was supposed to contribute 10 percent of its income from the sale of the membership forms to the central League.

In the process of its reorganization, the ConML made several attempts to broaden its base by bringing Leaguers who stayed away from the convention within its fold. At first, its leaders tried to stop the formation of a parallel organization, and even offered the president ship of the unified party to their rivals; but all these efforts failed (Afzal 1987, 56). Its parliamentary party in the National Assembly was formed in November 1962, whose strength originally consisted of 78 MNAs in a House of 156, and, by June 1964, this rose to 106. Muhammad Ali Bogra, then Minister for External Affairs, was the first leader of the parliamentary party. Other office –bearers of the parliamentary party were Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Abdul Ghafur Hoti and Sayyid Murid Husain Shah – deputy leaders; Zahir al-Din (Lal Mian) chief whip; Choudhury Zahur Ilahi –general secretary, Chaudhury Abdal Hamid whip and AM Qureshi –treasurer. On the death of Muhammad Ali Bogra, Abdal Sobur Khan was elected its leader in March 1963; Lt Gen. K. M. Shaikh then attended the election meeting as Ayub Khan’s representative (Time, 1963). In the East Pakistan Assembly, the people’s Democratic Group, established in June 1962, was changed into the ConML parliamentary party with A.T.M. Mustafa as its leader. It claimed the support of 112 members in a house 155. A non-muslim cabinet minister, Bhabani Shanker Biswas, and his supporters were made associate members of the party (Dawn, 1962). An intricate technology was created for the party’s reorganization. A twenty-four-member central reorganizing committee chaired by Choudhury Khaliq al Zaman, appointed two provincial organizers, who had large committees to assist them. The organizer for West Pakistan, Sardar Abdal Rashid, had a committee of over one hundred persons which included all the provincial and central ministers from West Pakistan, nineteen MNAs and eleven MPAs (Pakistan Times, 1962).

In December 1962, the party decided to complete enrolments by December 31, or at latest, by January 7, 1963, followed by elections to be finalized by the end of February 1963. The delay in the reorganization was, to a considerable extent, due to intra –party conflicts from the lowest to the highest levels. In West Pakistan the most serious rift developed at Karachi early in 1963, because of the differences between Nawab Yamin Khan, the organizer for Karachi, plus organizer for West-Pakistan, carried by the head controller. Choudhury Khaleq-al-Zaaman alleged that Nawab Yamin Khan was acting against the party interests in the enrolment campaign. The factional tussle in the East Pakistan ConML was more serious than in West Pakistan. Here two strong and mutually hostile groups led by Abul Hashim group, also sometimes referred to as a “Dacca group” was supported by

Qazi Qadir and Fazl al-Zaman. Each of the groups endeavored to discredit the other. Ayub desired to hang about over party strategy, as well as attempted to uphold the representation of objectivity in the politics of the ConML. This was done partly to allow the ConML to win over the CML.

In December 1962, party leaders announced the schedule for the membership enrolments and elections after consulting him. Despite all this involvement, he was still reluctant to associate himself directly with the party. In December 1962, when Khaliq al-Zaman invited him to assume the party leadership, he promised to consider the offer after the party's formal reorganization. On March 14, for party strength he issued an appeal to the people to join. Soon after; surprising progress forced him to join the ConML. On May 22, General Ayub came onward near a two Anna affiliate of the party in East-Pakistan as well as West Pakistan. His explanation for this was of Con,ML had sustained his agendas given that its inception, mutually and also in outside of the Lower House; and its leaders had been inviting him, individually as well as collectively, to become a member of the party and that he had finally joined it to fill a political vacuum and to promote stability in the country (Jang, 1963). The working committee of the ConML, nominated by Ayub Khan shortly after his election, prepared a fourteen-point socio-economic programme, which was announced at a press conference by Muhammad Shoaib and Abd al Waheed Khan, the central Finance Minister, and a member of the working committee. This programme, which was a reiteration of the policies followed by the regime during the past two years, endorsed the presidential constitution, the mode of indirect elections, and the structure of Basic Democracy, the principle of one component, as well as institution of the welfare country (Times, 1964). Ayub Khan's own distrust of political parties did not end with his assumption of the ConML leadership. On his election as president, he made the interesting observation that "the high command of the party should consult the government on the latter's policy before passing any resolution" (Dawn, 1963). This was the role he visualized for the party. Although he was nominated by the ConML as its candidate in the 1965 presidential elections, he conducted his campaign on a personal level and with the support of government rather than party machinery. Similarly, the ConML played no significant role in the elections to the Basic Democracies since it decided not to contest these elections on a party basis. In March 1965, the ConML entered a new phase of its history. Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto replaced Abdul Waheed Khan as the general secretary of the party. To introduce fundamental structural changes in the party the league leadership now resolved it. The changes were basic and quite altered the complexion of the party.

According to the Basic Democracies and the constitutional structure of the country, its structure was now virtually brought in line with the system. After paying the one-rupee enrolment fees for five years only. Muslim of eighteen years of age could become member of the party and as an associate member a non-Muslim could similarly enroll in the same procedure. Under the Electoral College Act of 1962, the grass-root unit was the Union Muslim League, covering the area of the electoral constituency. Some unexpected developments shook the party momentarily before the implementation of the new party constitution. By giving an aggressive posture to the party Ayub Khan tried to control the situation (Friedman,1960). The 'Awami League's six points and from the Tashkent Declaration threat to party solidarity arose quickly (News, 1966). For each province in November 1967, the number of the Electoral College members were increased by the central working committee, from 80,000 to 120,000-60,000 and in the following month, it was recommended by the league parliamentary party that for each house the strength of the central and

two provincial legislatures should be raised to 218 (Dawn, 1967). In Pakistan the ConML held complete sway on the political scene from 1966 to the first half of 1968. On December 31, 1966, when the Basic Democracies and politicians were lifted under restrictions, several of them made moves to join the ConML, and it did not hesitate to admit them to its ranks. Among those who thus entered the party were Qazi Muhammad, Sahibzada Hassan Mahmud, Qazi Akbar, Isa, Alamdar Hussain Gilani, Maula Bakhsh Soomro, Qazi Fazal Allah, Ayub Khuhro, Ghulam Muhammad Wassan, Arbab Noor Muhammad, Sayyid khair Shah. They joined it mainly because of its influence as the ruling party. Subsequently, at the center in the provinces some of them even become ministers (News, 1966). The ConML's vested financial resources especially during 1967-68 to enabled it to spend liberally on propaganda activities. It hired the services of a permanent employee of the national press Trust; it established a separate publicity wing in the secretariat of the central ConML. From the Union provisional league to cover one and a half year the elections to various tiers of the party were conducted (Shoukat, 2020). The delay was due to serious intra parties' conflicts that erupted at all levels. Factionalism divided the party into more than two groups in every major city of the West Pakistan. The state of the party's reorganization East Pakistan no better than in West Pakistan. There it claimed to have enrolled over five million primary members; and, by September 1967, it maintained that it had completed the formation of branches in 4,000 unions and 415 thanas. After Ayub Khan's endorsement, the name of the selected office -bearers were announced by the general secretary of the central ConML, Sardar Muhammad Aslam. Out of these nominations the rebels got only six offices. Situation was reviewed by Ayub Khan and he appointed a four -member pacification committee, consisting of Khawaja Shahab Al-Din (chairman), Sardar Muhammad Aslam, Malik Muhammad Qasim, Khawaja Hassan Askari. The matter came up again before the central council of the party in February 1969 because the committee proposed that the strength of the working committee be increased to fifty, but the rebels remained unreconciled (News, 1968).

A separate women's section of the party was made by the Convention Muslim League to organize a separate belated attempt. While neither the 1962 nor the 1966 Constitution made any provision for a separate women's section previously. However, the party did appoint a women's committee consisting of female MNAs and MPAs, during the 1964-65 elections, to canvass for the party candidates. Ayub Khan in April 1968 issued a directive to the provincial chiefs to form women subcommittee without any loss of time (Time, 1968). The following parties are the ones who favoured and supported Ayub Khan's regime: In 1948 the 'ulama' organized Jami'at al- 'Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP) and masha'ikh of the Brelvi school of thought. After the imposition of martial law its politics did not change. The control of all government mosques was administered by The JUP leaders, thus ultimately to save many giddies from a government. The JUP was the only religious political party that did not join any movement organized by the opposition parties till just before the downfall of Ayub Khan. During Martial Law, for presidential candidate the Jami'at-'Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) had decided its three point programme, to support a person who would agree. JUI demanded: firstly, that amendment in Muslim families Law, second point was about nominating of the members of the Advisory Council and third was about Ahmidies and definition of Islam in constitution. The JUI by organized Jihad conferences and collected defence funds during the indo-Pakistan war. The Jamat I Islami Pakistan (JIP) leaders skillfully maintained contact with their workers throughout the whole period of Martial Law (Rizvi,1989). JIP was also a member of COP. After the election JIP also supported the regime. The Convention ML had week mechanism in the

hands of Ayub to mobilize public opinion favorable to the regime. It was a creation from the top and suffered the disabilities of a king party (Yusuf, 1999). To inspire the people, the party had no economic programme. It stood in effect for the maintenance of the status quo. The power of the civilian authorities had gone away due to this advent situation. Large regions of East-Pakistan had already under the military control. Whatever possibilities might have occurred to Ayub seems like he wouldn't have entrusted authority in civil representative hands. Yet, it is difficult to see how the army could have indefinitely supported a regime which had lost the support of the people. The imposition of martial law evidently implied that the constitution would be scrapped. Ayub Khan resigned his office on 25 March, 1969.

CONCLUSION

Co-option of a specific group can best be termed as to accommodating it in the political system. General Muhammad Ayub Khan in 1958, warranted the coup on the basis that the country had to be rescued from disorder. Pre 1958 phase was fallout of the situation through which Pakistan faced national partition and ideological as well as organizational and safety dilemma. Ayub Khan materialized his dream by launching a coup in the fall of 1958 and abrogating the constitution of 1956 by imposing Martial Law. President Ayub Khan turned to consolidate his authoritarian regime, after forcing Iskandar Mirza to go for exile within few weeks of capturing power. General Ayub Khan in his first broadcast to the nation, on 8th October 1958, justified the imposition of Martial Law. There were two purposes for the expansion of influence of military regime to mass population in 1959. First, the main purpose was to allow people to participate at local level, but they were not allowed to participate at national level, secondly to use the local bodies as a tool for legitimizing the regime. It was a tool to bring together different sectors of society and to blend the skills of the commons and sophisticated ones. Basic Democracies were more apolitical in form and their functions were to make ordinary people feel, the need for their own development. Although Basic Democracies was a political, but it was also an initiative into the grassroots of economic and social reforms.

Through an electoral college comprising the elected B.D member's fixed indirect elections for the members of the national and provincial assemblies in 1962 constitution. There are those who argue against this system, not without cogency of sincerity and reasoning of purpose. On the behalf of the COP and due to the influence of Choudhury Muhammad Ali, Fatima Jinnah emerged as a candidate for the office of the president. The result of the election was that Field Marshal Ayub Khan won the elections. The Convention Muslim League, the spilt part of the old Muslim League, has certainly gained by organization with the president King Party. To inspire the people, the party had no economic programme. It stood in effect for the maintenance of the status quo. Yet, it is difficult to see how the army could have indefinitely supported a regime which had lost the support of the people. The imposition of martial law evidently implied that the constitution would be scrapped, and Ayub Khan resigned his office on 25 March, 1969.

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