



Poor Border Management and its Implications for the Education of Pak-Afghan Youth

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Abstract:

Afghanistan and Pakistan are faced with multiple challenges as they need to concentrate on the safety, security, and development of their educated people. It is the core responsibility of both states to provide them with greater educational facilities and job opportunities in peaceful conditions. The porous border and poor border management between Afghanistan and Pakistan pose threats to the future of young students on both sides. This qualitative study utilized the phenomenological analysis technique for exploring the lived experiences of both sides' nationals. The paper aims to highlight the meandering implications of border related issue between both states on their education sector. The findings of the study describe the linkages and adverse effects of security dilemma on education sector caused by political differences of both sides in the context of Durand Line under four sections viz. (a) impacts of border skirmishes on the education sector of Afghanistan and Pakistan; (b) effects of bilateral cooperation in the education sector; (c) imminent threat of radicalization in academia; and (d) rising threat of young educated drug addicts. The study gives recommendations to manage the educational challenges for young people in the current era.

Keywords: Pakistan, Afghanistan, porous, border management, refugee students, Durand Line, education sector crisis, drug trafficking

INTRODUCTION

With the assiduous efforts of the military and the support of the nation, Pakistan has effectively wiped out the militancy from its tribal regions by paying a huge cost. However, the possibility of terrorists' hidden sanctuaries still exists in major localities of frontier regions. While the majority is

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removed as a result of military operations and shifted their networks from the bordering areas of Pakistan to the Afghan side. Although, from here extremists are deliberately involved in continuing their terrorist activities on Afghan and Pakistani soil. The continuous threat of militancy creates confusion in the peace process of both countries. The Doha Dialogue had given illusion of sustainable peace in Afghanistan-Pakistan and withdrawal of NATO forces. But the situation is getting worst after the Taliban takeover of Kabul. The sustainable peace and human security become the politics of the Afghanistan (Threlkeld & Easterly, 2021). The fast paced changing situation in Kabul has once again directly affected the Pakistan's internal security and foreign relations with its immediate neighbors on east and west. As human security is itself a major challenge and non-traditional security threat for politically, socially and economically instable countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan (Javaid, 2016). The withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil never resolves the gigantic socio-economic issues of a country. Still Afghanistan is a buffer state in the security dynamics of the region, therefore, the mushrooming in its issues not only affects its local population solely but leaves impacts on its neighboring countries particularly in case of Pakistan.

The social-economic barriers have additionally weakened the roots of the state development of Afghanistan during 18 years of war against terrorism and even in recent times. Therefore, the impacts are deep enough to hollow the foundations of the system of the state. The chaos that exists among Afghan political leaderships provides opportunities to the potential criminal networks and violent state actors for their expansion in the state(s). The existing grievances and miseries at the individual level in the presence of illegal activities have further transformed the situation horrendously in Afghanistan. As 9/11 attacks had changed the world order in the pre-pandemic world. Afghanistan has gained the special attention of the international community due to numerous factors along with the status of the conflicted zone (Ahmad, Bakht, & Kalim, 2017). The aftermaths of the War on Terrorism (WoT) were proved to be disastrous at the multifaceted level for Afghanistan and Pakistan. It had not only changed the political dynamics of the region but also twisted the bilateral relations and foreign policies of both states towards each other. The successive political leadership of both countries had observed prolonged clashes on Durand Line since 1947 (Dupree 1973, 804).

It is evident in the history, as both countries are continuously involved in the blame game and accused each other of continuous immersion in using borders for state terrorism. To control the unauthorized two-way border movement and regulate the Afghan population within the state, the government of Pakistan (GOP) decided to register and return all Afghan refugee communities of Afghan origin residing in bordering as well as in other areas of the country to Afghanistan in 2017. It approved the validated system of the document (passport and visa) for all Afghan travelers across the border in 2017. While out of 3.3 million Afghan refugees, only 1.3 million were registered while the rest of the population remained unregistered. Moreover, the government endorsed the merger of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in 2017 and held general elections in the erstwhile FATA in 2018. In this manner, the government decided to ensure law enforcement, while, the separate status of FATA, its black Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR), and the absence of federal control on tribal areas was nullified ("Major Changes Made," 2011).

LITERATURE REVIEW

On international level, Durand Line is considered as an international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although, several negotiations and agreements are signed to moderate the rigidity of both conflicted parties on the border tensions. But Afghanistan's successive governments and currently the Taliban government always have a strong stance on the disputed nature of their common border with Pakistan. While Pakistan always opposes its stance at every forum. In the presence of disputes on border, both states and their diplomatic communities have always failed to develop friendly relations. The Afghan animosity was further escalated after the flinch of War on Terror in 2001 (Hilali, 2017). Due to Afghan irredentism on the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan issue, Pak Afghan relations generally remained uneasy as both states pursued realist course of action and tit for tat policies towards each other. Both states faced challenges of militancy, terrorism and resulting economic, political and security problems especially for the people living on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border (Naazer. 2020). It has also been argued that after its failure to keep the British Indian empire united and avoid its partition, the leadership of All Indian National Congress (AINC) strove to inflame ethnic nationalism and separatism in smaller provinces of Pakistan to undermined the Two Nation Theory. It also used as the successive Afghan soil, and ruling elites as well as nationalist political parties in different provinces of Pakistan as part of its surrogate warfare for diverse political and security interests against Pakistan (Naazer 2019).

Pakistan is the second largest host country, supporting the world's largest displaced population, Afghan refugees after the Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan. The country had allowed 3.3 million Afghan refugees to live and trade on Pakistani soil. This was also a challenging situation for Pakistan to manage and fulfill the needs of such a huge population while giving them a share in its national economy, when its people are deprived and struggling hard for their bread and butter.

The arrival of Afghan refugees opened the window for the arrival of several illegal activities, trade and establishment of black markets in Pakistan. The porous nature of the Durand Line greatly supported both Pashtun and Afghan communities living on both sides of the border for their survival and businesses. The soft policies of successive governments in Pakistan facilitated the poor population and also provided a chance for criminals and non-state violent actors to establish safe sites for their illegal trade activities. The mixing of poor & ethnically divided populations with illegal network stakeholders in adjacent bordering areas created big challenge for security agencies in monitoring them. Sooner, the tribal areas of Pakistan got the status of the hub of illegal activities with the strong support of a porous border (Ullah et. al., 2017). However, when the military and political leadership of Pakistan started operations in tribal areas against criminal networks after its alliance formation with America in 2001, several networks unveiled and truncated that are facilitated by Afghan refugees. To secure its border from the western side, Pakistan took tough decisions against the serious allegations of the Afghan government.

Whenever border skirmishes gain hype between both states, borders are often closed for several days. This illogical approach of higher authorities of border closure negatively affects the movement of common people, NATO supply, and trade activities across the border. Moreover, Pakistan has also taken the legitimate initiative to construct a gate at the Torkhum border and seven other entry points including Arandu in Chitral, into FATA including Ghulam Khan inside North Waziristan, Angoor Adda inside South Waziristan, Mohamand agency, Gursal inside Bajaur,

Kharlachi inside Khurram and Chaman inside Baluchistan and started fencing to its western borders in 2018 (Khan, 2019). While Afghanistan strongly condemned the new border security policy of Pakistan and regarded it as the artificial border (fencing) which has hurt the sentiments of the Afghan Pashtun community that was already divided with the commencement of the Durand Line and partition of the Subcontinent (Gul, 2017). The Afghan government rejected the proposal of border fencing and repatriation of Afghan refugees considered a harsh step taken by the Pakistani government to increase the problems of the poor Afghan population. As Afghanistan is unable to manage such a huge population in the scarcity of resources and conflicts in its own country (Parvaz, 2016).

While Pakistan considers the initiative for Border Security Management (BSM), the major part of its National Action Plan 2015, as a progressive step for maintaining peace among both countries. It is a challenging task for both states to counter the changing nature of security, competition in economic growth, non-state violent actors, and the emergence of new terrorist groups such as Islamic State (IS) or Daesh, human and drug traffickers, insurgency, surgical strikes, and terrorism in their states (Salahuddin, 2016). The history of both countries lacks pleasant ties and dedication to collaboration towards the gain of their mutual security interests. Therefore, it can be elaborated more appropriately by quoting the statement of Victor Davis Hanson, "Between Friends, unfenced borders enhance friendship; among the unfriendly when fortified, they help keep the peace" (Hanson, 2016). Moreover, the problems of the Afghan population either in Afghanistan or Pakistan are still unresolved, while the issues faced by the common population because of the Afghan population are not addressed yet. Nonetheless, the cause of all socio-economic crisis and vulnerable security conditions on both side of border is the politics of border.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The qualitative research methodology is used for the conduct of the exploratory study. The data is gathered through primary and secondary sources. The primary data is gathered through covert participant observation technique along with semi structured and unstructured interviews. For in-depth understanding and inquiry of conditions of the targeted population of the study, phenomenological approach is utilized by the researcher. The interviewees participated in the study are mainly young Pak-Afghan students, academicians, journalists, paramedical staff and education policy makers. The reliability and validity of the data is maintained throughout the study. The data is analyzed through thematic content analysis. The study followed all the research ethical considerations.

REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

According to Barry Busan's regional security complex theory, nations are clustered and develop their ties according to the security dynamics of the region. The reciprocity effect in security ties of countries promotes rivalries against each other. The dynamics in security ties also transforms when the conflicts develop between a country and its neighboring countries or between neighboring countries with its neighbors and need to be resolved through non-political channels. The development in security ties is based upon various reasons: territorial or border tensions, ethnic animosity, historical or political differences, clash of ideological or religious groups, alliance formation of one side with great or super or regional power(s).

In case of Afghanistan and Pakistan, both states are facing massive internal and external issues and challenges of human security, border mismanagement, political instability, clash of foreign policy goals, and lack of mutual interest building, ethnic differences at population level, health / education sector crisis and terrorist activities. All these issues have tremendous potential of putting them in hot water and influencing the security ties of both states. The change in the security situation of any one state directly affects its immediate neighbor firstly by promoting the atmosphere of rivalry at governmental level than other neighbors, secondly, it fuels tense environment at Pak-Afghan border and thirdly, it deadly affects the nations especially the young educated students across the border(s) and region(s).

EFFECTS OF POOR BORDER MANAGEMENT ON THE EDUCATION SECTOR OF AFGHANISTAN

Education plays a key role in certifying to the development of the state. Without knowledge and guidance, no individual, society, or state can progress and build good relations with other states. In the presence of illiteracy and chaos, it would be difficult for the state to fulfill the basic needs of its people and ensure economic growth. Countries like Afghanistan, an economically remote country that consist of 31percent of its adult population have a history of numerous socio-economic problems. According to a UNDP survey report, the overall literacy rate in Afghanistan is 38.2percent that can only read and write their name. The low literacy rate in Afghanistan is also linked to the geographical and gender division in the country. The students in Afghanistan have been suffering and struggling hard for more than 30 years (United Nations Development Program, 2015). According to United Nations almost 80percent of the school going teenager Afghan refugees are currently not enrolled in education system of Pakistan. The teenager Afghan girls both in Pakistan and Afghanistan need to be enrolled in the educational institutes in the era of Taliban government when girl's education (both in single gender and co-educational institutes are banned) is highly controversial in Afghanistan (Jones, 2022).

The weak and inflexible policies of the successive Afghan government affected the education sector in Afghanistan. Moreover, the recent takeover of Taliban government raised fear of being killed or oppressed in large number of families. Majority have left their homes, and businesses in Afghanistan and migrated to Pakistan as in close geographical proximity. In the government of Taliban, the anxiety of point of no return among Afghan youth has further aggravated their problems in Pakistan. The lack of basic facilities, violence, unemployment, health sector crisis weak institutions, gender based discrimination and low standard of education in Afghanistan has compelled Afghan students for migration. Although, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Pakistan has provided humanitarian services in the support of education sector Pakistan to cater the educational needs of Afghan refugees. According to UNHCR education strategy (2020-2022), it has inaugurated a mega educational program and opened institutes with interventions for 56,000 refugee children including primary and secondary education through 153 schools, 48 satellites classes, 55 home-based girls' schools (HBGS), 1319 paid teachers and 13 early childhood education centers organized in 54 refugees' villages (RVs). In KP province (2022), there are 35% percent girls out of enrolled 31,266 students studying in RVs (UNHCR, 2020).

The Afghan government's educational policies not only hindered the learning process within a country but, their ignorant policies towards the resolution of certain internal issues and differences with neighboring states (in case of Pakistan) act as a hurdle for Afghan refugee students in their

academic growth in those states. The challenges of Afghan refugee students are never fully diminished by these educational reforms of UNHCR Pakistan and Government of Pakistan joint ventures. There are major hurdles the large number of young Afghan students are facing in Pakistan includes:

1. After Ashraf Ghani Government 1.44 million Afghan refugees registered them while more than 600,000 Afghan population is non-registered yet and no record of immigrated Afghan refugees shared by Pakistan authority. Therefore, non-documented Afghan refugees are unable to avail the admission even in primary schools of Pakistan (Shehzad, 2022).
2. Non availability of land for residential area setup near schools for 32percent Afghan refugees living in camps and 68percent living in cities, towns and villages
3. Non provision of birth certificate or B-Form demanded by public or private schools for their admission
4. Lack of infrastructure, resources and facilities and low standards of socio-economic conditions.
5. Here, it is important to highlight the deleterious challenges faced by Proof of Registration (POR) cardholder Afghan refugees. The miseries of these POR holder Afghan families have another dimension as temporary protection from being rejected without availing any economic opportunity and social security. They are not considered for job, admission in educational institutes, hospitals not even pregnant women avail the health facilities at the time of delivery and skill development opportunity. As Pakistan is included among those 30 countries that gives unconditional birthright citizenship under Section 4 of Citizenship Act of 1959 but this is not applicable in case of Afghan refugee's even POR cardholders. They are unable to setup family, marriage, buy property, vehicles, shops (even on rent), mobile network sim card, open bank account, and apply for CNIC/Pakistani Passport like other citizens (Zaidi, 2018). Therefore, due to close bars, fear of being deported to Afghanistan and lack of laws, majority of them work in black markets, do low graded jobs, and young students (school, college and university going) are mainly boys involved in child labor. While girls do household tasks, tailoring, laundering and cleaning at low wages for bearing their family financial needs. Both the genders are at high risk being trapped by criminals for illicit trade and exploitation as large number of young Afghan refugees are out of educational institutes and working in an insecure environment just for their survival (International Organization for Migration, 2017).

Likewise, the firm existence of political differences on border management between Afghanistan and Pakistan have brought negative impacts on the education sector.

Implications for the Bilateral Cooperation in Education Sector

Rahmanullah claimed that on a weekly and monthly basis, the majority of Afghan students above the age of 15 cross the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan from Kabul to Torkham for getting education in educational institutions of Pakistan. These students also become the victims of the border conflict between both states. Whenever border clashes are at their peak, it always results in border closure. This border closure greatly affects the studies of young Afghan students. Afghanistan has a shattered economy and the poverty level exists at the national level is 35.8percent depicting the heavy load of the enormous population on its economy. The condition of the educational institutions in the country is not remarkable. To support the education sector in Afghanistan, the Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan has offered more than 3000 scholarships to Afghan students in Pakistan for their education. The number of Afghan students who gained education in Pakistan's education system at schools, colleges, and universities comprise more than 28,000 in the last three decades. Whenever borders are closed, both military attacks and

political leadership use political strategies to suppress each other. In the present state level rivalry, both Afghan and Pakistani students pay the ultimate cost in terms of loss of educational process, tenure, and academic opportunities (Rahmanullah, Personal Communication, Feb. 22, 2018).

Rahmanullah further added the negative effects of the decision of the 2017 Pakistani government on Afghan students. Approximately, 6000 Afghan students were enrolled at that time in different educational institutions of Pakistan according to a survey of government organizations. This is the reason insecurity existed among Afghan students who were in Pakistan and those who were present in their hometown (Rahmanullah, Personal Communication, Feb. 22, 2018).

The despondent situation of Afghan students in both states raises questions to the reckless policies related to border management. The uncertainty and tension on Pak-Afghan border is not only linked to the security point of view and state-level conflict, but it is deep, cursive, and broader in its impacts encompassing the social, and economic sectors of the local population. Without peace on the border, no stability and development can be ensured in a single state. It is also a matter of concern that without socioeconomic development and the presence of insecure borders, no state or its individuals can progress and grow. Education is a sector that produces new brains and polishes the talent that lies in the youth of the country. Other than the adverse effects of the Pak-Afghan border tensions on Afghan students, there is a need to highlight the efforts of Afghanistan for educating its population. Higher education in present-day Afghanistan remains a fragile area and has several shortcomings that need to be improved including the access of girls to educational institutions and higher education, lack of competent teachers especially female teachers, lack of qualified people and innovation in the administrative process, corruption, and nepotism, following old guidelines in curriculum, massively dependent upon foreign assistance, having scanty of resources and feeble infrastructure (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

Another important factor that acts as a challenge along with these above-mentioned factors is the clash of educational policymakers with the local and traditional norms of Afghan society. As some educationists and policymakers assume that the education system in Afghanistan can be improved if it is transformed by introducing western elements like the co-education system, change in dress code, conducting recreational activities, cultural events, and concerts for modernizing them from the orthodox system of Afghanistan. However, it will prove to be a wrong attempt for improving the education sector because the cultural elements of Afghanistan are prominent and religiously followed by educationists. It will become very hard to run educational institutes in a war-torn country in the presence of these westernized elements. This will further provoke illiteracy and especially create hurdles for girls' education in a country (IPS, 2009).

Furthermore, in this era of globalization, lack of educational facilities, ignorant policies of the Afghan government towards education, and border clashes with Pakistan cause the brain drain process in a country. The rising ratio of brain drain is ultimately dangerous and one of the key factors in the decline of its economic growth. According to a survey report, Afghan students are highly interested in going abroad and settling their families in the future. Approximately 60percent of Afghan students are getting an education from abroad, investing their skills and knowledge in foreign infrastructure and will serve their system (Karrslon & Mansory, 2007). Many educational institutions that were either opened by the Higher Education Commission of Afghanistan or Pakistan are also the victims of political tactics. Some are merged with other institutions or closed

by successive governments, for example during the regime of the Taliban University of Dawat and Jihad was initially established and opened in Hijarat Qilla Peshawar in 1985. Later on, it was moved to Kabul and merged with Islamic Research University in 1995 which was closed under the Taliban regime (Jones, 2012). Similarly, the Academy of Islamic Education and Technology faced a crisis during the Taliban government in the 1990s. But under the Karzai regime, it was only merged with other institutions of the state without upgrading it with advanced facilities for Afghan students.

Although, after the Taliban regime, when Hamid Karzai's government had taken the charge of Afghanistan, several strategic plans and initiatives had been taken, though the challenges to the education sector in Afghanistan were still the same. The consistent reluctant behavior of the Afghan government towards its education sector is further worsening the problems of Afghan students (Jones, 2012). However, the international community and international organizations have invested enough in the development of Afghanistan since 2001. In July 2016, the U.S. government's Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) issued a quarterly report on "developments in the three major sectors of Afghanistan's reconstruction effort," one of which is education. The report further elaborates on the enrollment of students in Afghan educational institutions. Afghanistan reportedly has 15,249 general education (government) schools and almost 8.7 million students are enrolled. The number of enrolled students is the sum of present and absent students. The Afghan Ministry of Education (MOE) counts students who have been absent for up to three years as enrolled because it says they might return to school. The MOE acknowledged that a large number of Afghan children are out of school, but lack of record of Afghan students always cause confusion about their total number and their existence (World Education News + Reviews, 2016).

This is a horrible upshot of the rigid and ignorant policies of the successive Afghan governments toward their nationals by not resolving a border clashes with Pakistan. The wrong policies of Afghan governments and educationists towards the education sector are playing a vital role in obscuring the problems of young Afghan students in their state. No state or international organization can bring reform until and unless the Afghan government takes serious steps for the betterment of its nationals.

EFFECTS OF POOR BORDER MANAGEMENT ON THE EDUCATION SECTOR OF PAKISTAN

While in the case of Pakistan, the implications of poor border management and occasional tension on Pak-Afghan border are also proved to be devastating in multiple ways by thoroughly analyzing the international and national newspapers specifically for observing the ratio of terrorist activities in recent decades in Pakistan. Several renowned militant groups are highly active in both states especially in Pakistan like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Islamic State (IS), and many other notorious terrorist organizations involved in extremist activities. Major incidents clearly illustrate the effects of non-regulated porous border and militancy on educational institutions and training facilities. Terrorist attacks massively and viciously engulfed the lives of innocent young learners in Pakistan like the militant attack on an APS School, in Peshawar in 2014 resulted in 140 deaths including young students and other staff members ("Pakistan Taliban," 2014). Meanwhile, Bacha Khan University terrorist attack in Charsada in 2016 resulted in the deaths of 21 students (Akbar, 2016). Another colossal terrorist attack on Police Academy outside Quetta in 2016 resulted in 59 deaths of police trainees and injuries (Boone, 2016). Similarly, three

militants attacked the hostel of the Agricultural Training Institute (ATI) Peshawar in 2017 resulting in the killing of nine individuals and left 37 injured (Farhan, 2017).

It is highly required to acknowledge the fact that secure borders must be ensured for producing productive people in a society. The aforementioned examples of terrorist attacks depict the vacuum created due to lack of border management which proved to be highly injurious for the common masses. The question arises that from where these terrorists enter the territory of the country and hit their targets? The answer is the porous nature of the border between the two states. Once Pakistan supported the Taliban and empowered them in Afghanistan for its strategic goals in Afghanistan. The political and security interests of Pakistan shifted from Afghan Taliban to the US as it formed its alliance with the US in the War on Terror in 2001 (Nawaz, 2009). It stopped its support for the Taliban but in the meantime, it tried to do efforts that favor its interests. In a realist world, every state changes its behavior as its interests are changed. The porous border of Afghanistan and Pakistan always served as a lifeline to terrorist activities that have shattered security at the societal level and given a strong blow to the economic progress of the country.

Imminent Threat of Radicalization in Academia

While giving an interview to the international news agency, Hussain Haqqani mentioned that the porous nature of the Pak-Afghan border is considered as a soft border by the residents of border areas and Afghanistan. Its porous nature also serves as a key player in sectarian brutality, particularly in Pakistan. For the establishment of militancy in a certain state, there is always required weak security conditions. In the presence of border skirmishes, one should understand the rising threat of a strong network of IS in Afghanistan and Pakistan territory is inevitable. The influence of this challenging militant group upon the common people is varying and tough to encapsulate as compared to other terrorist groups. The evidence of IS presence in both countries has depicted the major role of the porous border for their free movement. The unchecked points of the Pak-Afghan border and weak security measures allowed the new militant group to reach to the youth bulge, especially in educational institutions of urban areas including colleges and universities. This new form of the militant group is also called the fourth generation of jihadists.

The cause of their greater concentration in the Af-Pak region is based upon three reasons: Firstly, free & easy accessibility of ungoverned localities; Secondly, favorable environment for the promotion of extremist ideologies in the target population, and; Thirdly, gaining attention and sympathies of a large group of youth tending to be associated with the militant group for a religious cause. While the headquarter and cells of IS present in the eastern province of Nangarhar, in Afghanistan specified for the Af-Pak region while there are no proper organizations formed in Pakistan but several self-governed cells associated with IS and other extremist groups including Jandullah, and Jamaat-ul-Aharar (JuA), are operating in big cities like Karachi, Lahore, Sialkot and Hyderabad of country. These cells are involved in coordination for operating various activities like terrorist attacks, fundraising, increasing the number of followers, and propagandizing the agenda of IS across the border.

In the meanwhile, various reports and arrested agents from different cities of Pakistan show their free movement from the porous border. Some major examples are: in 2015, female militants of IS were arrested from Karachi involved in fundraising, matchmaking, and distributing pamphlets and

CDs holding IS propaganda content. Similarly, Bushra Network was exposed on the complaint of a missing girl family in the local police station. This network was governed by Bushra Cheema from Syria, professionally she was a religious scholar having M. Phil in Islamic Studies from Punjab University Lahore. She had connected herself with social work of educating people and was running an Islamic School named as Noor-ul-Hudaa Islamic Center, in Lahore. In this manner, she abducted 20 girls from different areas and transferred them to the Syrian branch of IS. In 2016, a key member of the female wing of IS group was exposed by security agencies in Karachi (Ullah, 2013). Meanwhile, in the same year and city, another major progress in capturing IS militants were seen when IS Commander Kamran Gujjar was seized. Various other militant groups were also seen running their training camps and madrassa systems and disseminating their anti-state agendas in the name of religion by providing food, boarding, and training to the vulnerable young students mainly from remote areas with weak financial status, one of most famous example is Pakistani jihadist, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who initially formed in Iraq's Irbil city in 2013, was running madrassa in Islamabad. It was associated with the anti-Shia Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. However, in 2007 he and his brother started a protest against the state law by involving madrassa students. Later on, Abdul Rashid Ghazi was killed in a military operation with the loss of many young students' lives (Basit, 2021).

Now, the situation is getting more complicated and unpredictable as the emergence of IS in the Af-Pak region is not only restricted to the societal level but it is intervening in educational institutions in an unprecedented manner. The horizon of IS ideology is highly vast and fluid that educated young people are tremendously adopting and highly indulging in the discourse of IS message. The presence and approach of IS elements in schools, colleges, and universities raise serious objections to the security measures of both the states. If both states are struggling hard for their security grounds, forming alliances, and investing in their defense system then how that may be influenced is rapidly aggravating and doing illegal activities by directly involving the young population of both states. The reason behind the success of IS interventions in the Af-Pak region is their changed strategy as compared to other militant groups. As they are utilizing and manipulating educated minds for their violent goals. Therefore, they are using human intelligence abilities and technological advancements more than weapons, like they are engaging different age groups of youth via social media and recruiting them as a stakeholder in their locality. In this manner, they are followed by highly energetic, vibrant young people who massively support them in the enlargement of their network (Jones, 2012). As IS network is targeting diversified communities and permits its trainees to connect with youngsters without any discrimination of language, culture, and geographical demographics. In this manner, they are easily surviving within different communities of both countries while keeping their identity uniform and anonymous simultaneously. The emergence of IS new leaders, units, and methods of harnessing the Pak-Afghan youth bulge via the internet and social media, provoking radicalism in the educated population and discourse of extremist narratives is adding and aggravating the complications in already existing conflicted zones.

The IS network is highly based on promoting cyber radicalization. Therefore, in the era of globalization, Pak-Afghan porous border and their online social media platforms are collectively providing support and reducing the geographical distances among local young people and are network developments with the continuous flow of information and connectivity. Defeating IS

group in Afghanistan was one of the major goals of the Afghan Policy of the Trump Administration, as, they are declared by the tripartite meeting held in Moscow in Dec, 2016 as the “main threat” in the war-torn country. While on the other hand, IS networks have attained special attention in top-level security dialogs and two invincible accomplishments in the Af-Pak region, firstly, building collaboration with sectarian (Anti-Shia) local and regional extremist groups helping them to retain their presence in a region in a long term, secondly, their ideological victory echoing among educated youth circle (Zahid, 2017). IS or Daesh is one of the major non-state violent forces providing fuel to Sunni-Shia conflict in a region. Hence, the chances of online radicalization are higher in both countries, particularly in Pakistan.

According to survey reports, nearly 30 million internet users are in Pakistan while the user count in Afghanistan is 2.4 million. Majority of the internet users use the internet on portable electronic devices like mobile phones and tablets. Out of these millions of internet users, approximately 70 percent of users comprise youth. The existing danger of increased cyber radicalization and the access and uprising of IS ideology in Pakistan raises doubts about the hidden facilitators and governing bodies in the educational vicinities. The success of IS network in the Af-Pak region is alarming and clearly shows the policy failure of the security forces of both states either in securing their common border or within the state(s). Although, both states completely acknowledge the disastrous outcomes of online radicalization evident in the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia in current decades (Basit, 2021). Consequently, the persistent sense of deprivation among the young (educated) vulnerable population, political instability, Pak-Afghan blame game policy, and economic crisis in both countries are providing a conducive environment to the expansion of IS web and cyber radicalization on large scale in the Af-Pak region.

Rising Threat of Young Educated Drug Addicts

Another important aspect of analyzing the implications of the Pak-Afghan porous border is the imminent threat of drug use among different age groups in educational institutions of Pakistan. The imprudent policies of the Pak-Afghan governments are directly casting effects on the youth bulge and creating a new market for drug trafficking. While having a conversation with different health practitioners (psychiatrists & psychologists) of Institute of Psychiatry developed by World Health Organization (WHO) in Benazir Bhutto Hospital, Rawalpindi over the issue of rising number of young drug addicts in their OPDs and wards, they emphasized the alarming high ratio of young drug addicts of both genders. Annually they mentioned 600 to 700 patients visit OPD including teenagers (from mild to severe level), while 300 are follow up cases that are not willing to admit in wards. While in wards around 150 to 200 patients are admitted including those who do not have any family but sponsored by various humanitarian, social welfare and charity organizations like Al-Khidmat, Aurat Foundation, Umeed Welfare Organization, Edhi Welfare Organization, Chippa and Akhuwat Trust etc. Young students ranging from school level to university level are direct victims of drug traffickers. The major population of drug addicts belong to KP, Baluchistan, Afghan refugees, North-South Waziristan, and other parts of erstwhile FATA. For an in-depth understanding of the issue, a series of focused group discussions were arranged with college and university students (males & females) of the age group (18- 30 years) having various ethnic backgrounds: Peshawar, Mardan, Mohmand agency, Quetta, Chaman, Batgram, Balakot, Swat, Dir, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Helmand, Khost, Nurestan, Nimruz by the researchers. For transcribing the lived experiences of young students, a phenomenological analysis approach was

used. The findings revealed the horrible picture of the society. According to them, approximately 50 percent of the young educated drug addicts belong to the upper middle class and elite class. They have also highlighted the causes of the high ratio of young drug addicts:

- 1) To maintain status due to class differences
- 2) To look modern, play drug games over the bet and rich against the opposite gender
- 3) Due to peer pressure in the educational institutions
- 4) To gain relief or escape from psychological stresses of studies, deprivation, bullying and exploitation
- 5) An easy access to drugs in educational institutions as availability of secure delivery facilities and online purchasing services
- 6) Majority of drug addicts live in hostels where no elder/caretaker/ parent monitor their movement and activities during their academic tenure in and across the cities
- 7) Sometime private hostel administration is involved in the smooth drug supply from dealers to clients on some commission.
- 8) They also mentioned that giving admission to Afghan students in Pakistani educational institutions also plays an important role in the easy transmission and inclusivity of drugs in the educational sector. The ratio of young age drug abusers varied among the provinces of the vulnerable country. The high ratio of drug abusers in educational institutions is incipient to an uncontrollable problem nowadays.

The surveys conducted by NGOs, the Ministry of Narcotics, and the Punjab Higher Education Commission revealed the usage of psychoactive substances among girls and boys in colleges and universities. While elite-class students heavily indulge in the addiction of cocaine, meth, and ecstasy. It is also revealed in the report that a large proportion of drug consumption is relatively high among students of KP as compared to other provinces. Several factors are involved, as KP lies near Afghanistan, due to the porous border, the transit of narcotics is relatively easier in KP from the border as compared to other provinces. While conducting conversations with various medical staff of drug rehabilitation centers (public/ private sector) located in Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Charsada, and Dir approximately 11-12percent of the young population consists of drug abusers in KP. While several search operations conducted by Anti-Narcotic Force and university administration reported large quantities of crystal meth and crack cocaine from the university and private hostels of Peshawar (Qasim, 2018).

While the situation is comparatively controlled in Punjab and Sindh because of strict laws and strong actions taken against students involved in drug abuse in terms of police cases, issuing warning letters for violating the law, heavy fines and punishments, and in most cases, banning students (declared drug abusers) for taking admission in any other institute for few years. Moreover, another important measure to trace drug abusers and their ratio in public-private educational institutions is by conducting blood screening tests once a year. It will help the institutions and government not only to locate and control the vulnerable population from dreadful diseases like Hepatitis B & C, HIV/AIDS, and lung and mouth cancer but also reveal the number of drug abusers in a particular school, college, and university. While on an administrative level, at the

entry and exit points of provinces, security forces, and customs officers are appointed to check public and private transports closely.

Pakistan lies in the fifth position on the list of the drug abuser. Moreover, several facts are revealed by a drug trafficker arrested in Karachi, as he has confessed that above 80 percent of his customers comprised young educated students of famous universities for many years. The high ratio of young students is pointing to the alarming situation in Karachi. The deleterious impacts of the porous border are strongly supporting the drug traffickers to ruin the young generation of the country. The horrible facts of drug addiction in educational institution raise serious objections to the security provided by educational institutions to the students. The survey report of NGOs demonstrated that 53 percent of students of famous private school chains are heavily using drugs (Hussain et. al., 2009). While another survey mentioned in a report on drug addiction in educational institutions in Pakistan that out of every 10 university students, there is one drug addict. Around 9 million drug addicts exist in Pakistan and the majority lie in the age group of 15-25 while 57 percent of students are drug addicts using at least one drug in the educational institutions of Islamabad and Lahore (Elahi, 2009). Pakistan has a history of serving as a source, transit, and destination of Afghan-origin opiates and other narcotics. The high ratio of young students as drug abusers is one of the outcomes of unchecked border movement and oblivious policies of the Pak-Afghan governments towards the collaboration of resolving the border management problem.

CONCLUSION

Both states need first to resolve their differences on border management by engaging in political negotiations. To improve the education sector and defeat its challenges, there should be a provision of standard educational facilities to all Afghan and Pakistani students by devising comprehensive educational policies to invest young minds in their own countries for their future sustainable development goals. Moreover, policymakers, educationists, security agencies, and ministries should consider the evolving nature of socioeconomic and security challenges in their states. There is a need to ensure security within educational institutions. To save young educated students from the menace of drugs, academia, the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan and the Ministry of Narcotics should devise such practical policies that are strictly followed in all educational institutions. Another responsibility that comes to educational institutions is the use of highly advanced technical equipment to monitor their student's activities during their presence on the premises. The law enforcement agencies and ministry of interiors of both sides should come forward to develop a framework that can serve their mutual security interests.

Another vital reform needed to address the problem is the mechanization of the written agenda of the Border Security Initiative (BSI). It should comprise detailed procedures and strategies for combating terrorism, border movement, checking Afghan travelers (locals & students), vehicles, and traders, issuance of special passes, a list of contrabands, and a complete plan of action for each violation of the law. These efforts will bring fruitful results in multidimensional ways as they build trust and promote of sense of security among the local population on security measures. It will also assist law enforcement agencies in arresting traffickers, criminal networks, and terrorists. It will immeasurably promote harmony between states and their security agencies.

Additionally, to control the wave of online radicalization and the increasing influence of militant groups in educational institutions, ministry of technology, security forces, and interior ministries of both countries should also devise certain software and monitoring devices to control and monitor the militants and students' activities on social media and digital devices. There is a need of developing logical arguments that completely negate the IS ideology and help the young generation to understand their hidden extremist agenda. Therefore, civil society, religious scholars, and government officials of both countries should do radical efforts to prevent their young educated generations from the web of militancy.

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