



**Turkey's Evolving Policy in the Face of the Syrian Refugee Crisis:
Security Ramifications and Strategic Responses**

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Abstract:

This article examines the complex political and security ramifications that Turkey has to deal with in the face of Syrian Refugee Crisis. The article explores the crisis's effects on Turkey's national security, including the increased threat of terrorism, adjustments to foreign policy, strained ties with neighbouring countries, and internal political repercussions. It also examines the changes Turkey made to its response to the Syrian refugee crisis, from an open-door policy at first to increasingly restricted measures like securitization, repatriation, and resettlement plans. By examining these shifts, this article provides insights into the complex interplay between humanitarian challenges and Turkey's strategic responses to the Syrian refugee crisis. This study uses qualitative research method employing descriptive and exploratory techniques and relying mainly on the secondary data. The research reveals shift in alliances, diplomatic strategies, and geopolitical positioning. It also highlighted strained diplomatic relations with neighboring countries due to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. The study outlines internal political consequences, including changes in public opinion, electoral dynamics, and policy decision-making processes influenced by the Syrian Refugee Crisis.

Keywords: Turkey, security, refugees' crises, securitization, migration, humanitarian crisis

INTRODUCTION

Migration combined with refugees fleeing conflict is one of the important and difficult issues facing nation-states and the international community today. The emergence of the Arab Spring caused the widespread uprising against dictatorial regimes turned into one of the most important transformational forces in the Arab World, which created new dilemmas for Turkey's foreign policy.

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Protests were originated in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi, a street merchant received ill-treatment from the police, and to protest, he put himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid. After some days, his death turned into a form of national chaos that strained Tunisian President Zein al- Abedin to run off the country. Like a wildfire, demonstrations spread from one country to another in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. After the Tunisian uprising, demonstrations were overfed in Egypt and Libya; major uprisings were started in Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, Djibouti, Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, and Oman, and comparatively slight protests were blown up in Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Morocco, and Western Sahara to bring down their authoritative establishment. These demonstrations eventually reshaped the nature of politics and security in the Middle East (Abdelsalam, 2015).

In 2011 the Arab spring not only brushed Tunisia and Egypt but also knocked the Syrian Nation. The combination of cross border movement and the political motives for that movement had made refugees a central part of global politics. However, with the increasing number of people killed during the security crackdowns, the protests turned into an uprising against the regime". This civil war has forced many people to leave the country and hence the refugee crisis has developed as a new central point for political debate concerning the Middle East. This anarchy has given a chance to the terrorist groups to make a way into different countries posed as a refugee (Baltes, 2016).

The havoc and violence in Syria have caused mass migration to destinations both within the region and beyond. The current "refugee crisis" has escalated sharply and its impact is widening from neighbouring countries toward Europe. Today, the Syrian crisis is the major cause for an increase in displacement and the resulting terrible humanitarian situation in the region. Since the conflict shows no signs of abating soon, there is a constant increase in the number of Syrians fleeing their homes. Both Middle Eastern countries and countries outside of this region received a considerable number of immigrants from Syria in different periods Political environment of Syria has long motivated Syrians to move to other countries as they felt political oppression and insecurity. (Yazgan et. al., 2015).

The worst refugee crisis of the last decades, the war in Syria has left almost 12 million people in desperate need of humanitarian aid. There were 7.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) while over 4 million people have taken refuge in Syria's immediate neighbours; Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2015). Among these countries, due to its open-border policy, Turkey has received the largest number of Syrian refugees. The Syrian conflict, now in its tenth year, has resulted in one of the largest and most protracted refugee crises in recent history. With over 3.6 million Syrian refugees residing within its borders, Turkey plays a central role in managing this humanitarian challenge. Beyond the immediate humanitarian concerns, the crisis has far-reaching political and security implications for Turkey and the wider region (European Commission, 2015).

The primary focus of the research is to investigate how the Syrian refugee crisis is contributing to internal security challenges in Turkey. This implies an examination of various aspects related to security concerns within the country as a consequence of hosting a large number of Syrian refugees.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Regional and international diplomatic effort to resolve Syrian issue Turkey played significant role. When United Nation started a peace mission back in 2012, Turkey supported those plan within their limitation and actively involved I Syria regime change through diplomatic activities. The significant discussion about this issue has different opinion. Supporters are advocating the compulsion of Turkey policy towards Syria in order to increase its influence in regional politics and their role in European Union.

Francesco Siccardi describes in one report which published in Carnegie endowment for international peace that the Turkey involvement in Syria bring new opportunities to the management of refugee flows over European Union. He also mentioned Turkey involvement in Syria not only source of conflict or rapprochement with its neighbors and traditional partners in Middle East. Turkey also use new tool s for conducting foreign policy. He argues that Turkey involvement in Syrian refugee issue also change its images and international role (Siccardi, 2021).

Peerzada Tufail Ahmed in his article U.S-Turkey Relationship and Syrian Crisis argued that Tukey have two aims in Syria crisis firstly Turkey want to stop the flow of Syrian refugees and settle them in Syria in safe zone. He also mentioned in his article that the diplomatic and military capability of Turkey was not enough to play its role as a rule maker in the region (Ahmad, 2015).

In Strategic Gatekeeping: Geopolitical Objectives and Turkey's Syrian Refugee Policy article, author Maria Zaharatos in 2021, Author argue Turkey 2015 Turkey 2015 and 2016 foreign policy objectives was to reestablish its relationship with European Union an increase its influence in regional and European union politics. Tell the author also mention in this article that Turkey trying to increase its diplomatic relations with other regions like Asia Middle East Africa Balkans and its activities toward the Western Europe still very important in addition commitment to UN and NATO (Zaharatos, 2021).

METHODOLOGY

Turkey initially welcomed Syrian refugees after Arab spring crisis and made their policy an open-door refugee program. To Find out the implication of this policy and how its effect Turkey domestic and international policy, researcher will collect data through content and thematic analysis has been analyzed based on the identified themes. This approach allows for a structured examination of the information gathered, providing insights into the different dimensions of the Syrian refugee crisis and its implications for Turkey's internal security and its policy towards European Union. The research employs qualitative methods, indicating a focus on understanding the nuances, context, and subjective experiences related to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. The nature of the research is described as descriptive and exploratory. Descriptive research aims to provide an accurate portrayal of a situation or phenomenon, while exploratory research seeks to gain insights and understanding in areas where little is known. In this case, the research aims to describe the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Turkey's internal security and explore the measures taken by Turkey in response.

SYRIAN REFUGEES' CRISES AND CHALLENGES FOR TURKEY

Revolts, disorder, and political-economic instability arising in Syria interests and affects Turkey in a close manner, since the two countries share a long border. These unfavourable events show their effects not only in the economic world but also as the migration of large masses from Syria to Turkey. Therefore, it is inevitable for these events in the Middle East, especially in Syria to have an important cost for Turkey both in the economic and social aspects. Syrian civil war almost stopped all economic and trade relations between Turkey and Syria. Border gates on the Syria-Turkey border are the gateways of Syria into Europe and Turkey into the Arabic world. Many logistics companies that used to use these gates are adversely affected after the gates are closed due to the crisis. Besides, Turkey used to profit from foreign logistics companies using Turkey as a transit point on their journey to Syria, especially from Europe. Turkey lost an important part of this profit after the crisis (Government of Turkey, 2011).

Turkey's foreign policy was generally thought to be successful both by foreign and internal observers, until the start of the Arab Spring. Unrest in the Arab states marked the beginning of Ankara's problems. After the change in the regional status quo, Turkey's position in conflicts and its abilities to mediate them has also changed. Before the beginning of the pro-democracy protests, Turkey tried to keep good relations with the Syrian regime. However, after a brutal crackdown on protesters, Turkey demanded that President Bashar al-Assad must step down. What's more, it started to actively support the political and militant Syrian opposition. By doing that, Turkey perceived two objectives: first, to overthrow the Syrian regime, and second, to hinder the Kurdish aim of creating an independent Syrian opposition faction and fostering their efforts to fight the Syrian regime ("Turkey Syria offensive," 2019).

On June 22, 2012, a Turkish airplane was attacked by the Syrian forces. On May 11, 2013, a huge massacre and killing happened in the Turkish town, Reyhanli, near the borders. In September 2014, the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) attacked the Syrian town of Kobanion the Syrian border. On May 16, 2015, Turkey shouted at a Syrian aircraft that violated its airspace. On July 20, 2015, a suicide bomber blew himself in the town of Suruc located to the borders of Turkey and Syria which killed at least 32 people. Furthermore, the unexpected July 15, 2016, failed coup in Turkey that was launched by a group of officers the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) within the Turkish army, according to the experts and observers, totally reshaped the relations between Turkey and Syria. "Since Erdogan remains in power-perhaps now with the incident less internal opposition-there is no reason why he should not simply continue to pursue a Syria policy of his own choice, whatever it might turn out to be. But the effects of the coup on Turkey's foreign alignments and internal politics may still influence the way Ankara approaches its Syrian dilemma" (Zahra, 2017).

So far Turkey has tried to avoid direct military participation. However, July 23, 2015, saw the first exchange of fire between Turkey's military and ISIS (counting from the very beginning of the Syrian crisis). Turkey perceives the situation on its southern border as a security dilemma. Turkey could choose either to wait or hope that a solution to Syria's crisis would come without its interference or perceive ISIS and YPG as threats to its security and act against them. YPG is thought to pose a threat to the ethnic composition in northern Syria. More, the victories of the YPG could enhance the consolidation of the Kurdish territories that might lead to the creation of a "Kurdish corridor" or

some other kind of Kurdish polity. Such a development is greatly unwanted by Turkey, as it might facilitate Turkey's Kurds' aspirations of seeking independence. For a while, it seemed that Turkey had chosen the first option, but now the situation has changed. The Suruç attack worked as a wake-up call for Turkey's decision-makers to take action and both ISIS, as well as Syrian Kurds, is perceived as a threat. Turkey has started an active anti-terror campaign against both ISIS and PKK (Ergun, et. al. 2018).

Turkey shares 877 kilometres of land border with Syria, and Kurdish people mainly reside in the Syria-Turkey border region. The PKK, a Kurdish nationalist group in Turkey, for many years has been committing terror attacks inside Turkey. Until Adana accord in 1998, Syria was PKK's heaven. Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK received asylum in Syria. The unrest in Syria again brought the PKK challenge to the fore in Turkey. It has become very difficult for Turkey to prevent PKK militants from entering Turkey along with hundreds of Syrian refugees. Turkey fears the region may again turn into a backdoor for the PKK. Syria's reported support to PKK as retaliation to Ankara's sheltering the Free Syrian Army made the challenge more crucial for Turkey. In October 2011, the Syrian government warned that it would consider again supporting the PKK if it perceived Turkey was supporting the Syrian opposition. Assad stated that "Turkey could fall into a state similar to ours if it opposed Damascus". Besides the Kurdish threat, Turkey fears the sectarian conflicts in Syria may spill over into Turkey if they continue for a long time (Islam, 2016).

Turkey perceives this situation as a threat, which enhances Turkey's Kurdish separatism. However, the US traditionally retains its influence on the Kurds. If Ankara would like to suppress Kurdish national aspirations, it would expect help from Washington to stabilize the situation. If Washington could and would help Turkey on this matter, then Turkey should repay the favour with even bigger support in the fight against ISIS (which is at least partly happening right now, with permission for the US to use the Incirlik air base). Without the US's help against the formation of a Kurdish state, Turkey would have to risk unilateral intervention if such a situation would appear (Barkey, 2005).

Turkey fears the empowerment of 'the Syrian Kurds, who, exploiting the vacuum created by the Withdrawal of Assad's forces, have quickly emerged as a coherent political-military force. The extent of Turkish action remains unclear, but a broader involvement would entail Turkey in the lethal swamp lands of the Syrian-Iraqi war, as Turkey can prevent the expansion of the Kurds, but it would be too dangerous to attack the Kurds in Syria (Bellamy, et. al., 2017)

Since the emergence of the IS, Turkey has been used as a "jihadist highway," the main transit route to Syria. Members of IS cells have arrived in Istanbul by plane, after which they transit to border cities like Gaziantep, Antakya, and Kilis by plane or bus. Why have jihadist fighters chosen Turkey? There are three reasons. First, the Turkish government has adopted a visa-free policy toward many countries. Hence, jihadist fighters, especially from Europe, can easily enter Turkey. Second, Turkey is one of the most popular tourist destinations, receiving more than 35 million tourists a year. A large number of European tourists travel to the resorts of Antalya for vacations. So, terrorist fighters can easily blend in with these tourist groups. Third, Turkey and Syria share a border approximately 910-km long. Originally, Turkish and Syrian people in the border areas would often cross the border for shopping or business, and signed a visa-free agreement in 2009 and opened the border. After the start of Syrian civil war, Turkey revoked the agreement and closed the border in November 2011 except for refugees. Yet, Turkey cannot manage the flow over the border of

many people, including jihadist fighters. Of course, the Turkish government has attempted to block the movement of foreign fighters (Altun, 2019).

Turkey initially welcomed Syrian refugees through an open-door refugee program but has since adopted a more restrictive and securitized approach, including threats of forced deportation.

Turkey tries to project itself Regional power and made a deal with EU to restrict refugee movement toward Europe during 2015-2016. This agreement allowed Turkey to get more power in its relation with the EU. Involving international community in order to solve Syrian refugee issue would benefit both refugee and the host community.

European Union in March 2016 signed an agreement with Turkey, after this agreement 3 million of migrants had transited to reach EU. According this agreement, irregular migrant attempting to enter Greece would be returned to Turkey and Ankara also takes initiative to prevent new migratory routes. In return, the EU agreed for the settlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey, for Turkish citizens they will reduce visa restrictions, EU also Pay 6 Billion Euros aid to Turkey for Syrian Refugees and restart talk about Turkey membership to the European Union (Terry, 2021).

The increasing numbers of urban refugees are creating big challenges for Turkey. It is getting clear that Syrian refugees will not go back Syria in coming years. This situation makes realize government of Turkey to make new policy to deal refugees. In this difficult situation, weather the government should start to thing to offer refugees to remain stay in Turkey to addressing their education, employment, health, shelter and other needs of refugees. Secondly, growing number of Syrian refugees living outside the camps where to provide proper assistance is very difficult and complex. Thirdly, the growing numbers of Refugees in Turkey impacting negatively on economically, socially and politically to the host country. Turkey is the largest refugee-hosting country in the world with the vast majority of its approximately 3 million refugees coming from Syria (Ferris & Kirişci, 2016).

Causes of Shift in Turkey Policies towards Syrian Refugees

Threat of Terrorism

Open migration was a big threat for turkey internal security due to the concern of terrorism by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) whose separation was seems as a big threat to Turkish identity.

- To prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state, Turkey has taken military actions against Kurdish forces. Turkey considers the various Kurdish fighter groups and militias in Syria as security threats and has historically conducted transnational military actions that target Kurdish forces or populations on the one hand.
 - The second part of their objective in Syria is to ensure that these forces do not establish a Kurdish state.
1. Effects on regional relation: Middle Eastern countries relation deteriorating with Turkey because of Syrian conflict and Kurdish forces become ally with Syria that is main security concern of Turkey. This scenario led the turkey to more securitizes and adopt defensive approach in its foreign policy which also influence its refugee policies.
 2. Ensure internal security: To ensure Turkey internal security, it's focusing on resettlement and repatriation of refugees back to Syria, this shift in policies influenced by its security concerns.

As a result of the Syrian Conflict, Turkey established more restrictive border controls and limited the freedom of refugees. They limited their rights and protections under Turkish law because they have not secured Syrians legal status as refugees. After this, policy refugees had limited health facilities, and mobility due to movement and physical barriers.

Turkey Foreign Policy from 2016 to 2021

Turkish foreign policy from 2016 to 2021 has been to stabilize the situation in Syria to avoid additional influxes of refugees. 2016 represented a terrific turning point in the Syrian War, with Russia entering the conflict and changing the balance of power to favor Assad's dictatorship, weakening Turkey.

Power politics among major power have led the Turkey to adopt more securitized and defensive policies and strategically change their position in Syria. Turkey main goal was to counter Kurdish threat and letting Assad government to maintain their majority control. For example, in 2018, Turkey signed a de-escalation agreement with Russia and Iran regarding the situation in Syria, fearing security threats and spillover.

This foreign policy objective is also illustrated by Turkey's addition of defensive troops to the Syrian city of Idlib in 2020, hoping to prevent Assad's forces from overrunning the enclave of rebel control and triggering another refugee crisis.

Increased terror attacks from ISIS at home have also led Turkey to perceive open migration as a threat to internal security, which adds to the pre-existing Turkish concerns of terrorism on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), whose separatism is perceived as threatening to Turkish identity. (Snell, 2022)

Turkey's Refugee Policy

Two refugee policies that Turkey adopted in the period from 2016-2021; 1. securitization and resettlement, and, 2. repatriation, demonstrate. First, securitization refers to the increased border control, limitation of refugee status and protections, and limits to freedom of movement that Syrians experience in Turkey.

In terms of securitization, the E.U.-Turkey deal played a key role in this matter. During the conception of the deal and following its implementation, Turkey continued to threaten the E.U. with the idea of opening the gates. For example, in 2020, Turkey frustrated with the E.U. Lack of concessions, threatened a reopening of migration routes that would have led to thousands refugees fleeing towards Europe. This has led to multiple maritime disputes around migration between Turkey and Greece (Tsarouhas, 2023).

Turkey's focus on security has led to a more nationalist-oriented refugee policy, adding return discourse and repatriation to an already securitized environment. From the Turkish state's perspective, the Syrian conflict has allowed for multiple threats to develop against Turkey.

As such, since 2016, Turkey has established more restrictive border controls and limits to the freedoms of refugees. Furthermore, because Turkey has no plans to secure Syrians' legal status as refugees under the 1961 Optional Protocol, these asylum seekers remain a temporary migrant, which limits their rights and protections under Turkish law (Snell, 2022).

A report from 2020 details the following conditions: limited access to health, education, and mobility (due to movement restrictions, walls), as well as a precarious place in the labor market (working in the informal sector and lacking work permits). Surveillance has also greatly increased, which serves as a refugee security measure, but also one regarding the security threat of terrorism. In 2019, Turkish police was reported conducting roundups and ID checks, intimidating and threatening Syrians with deportations.

In a drastic shift from its previously welcoming policy, in recent years Turkey has been accused of deporting thousands of Syrian refugees as part of its repatriation and resettlement plan.

The border crossing department of Bab Al-Hawa reports that in the month of November 2021 alone, 964 Syrian refugees were deported by Turkish authorities. Under the Refugee Convention, repatriation is defined as voluntary return to one's country of origin, with the right of returning being protected.

In the case of Turkey's actions, it is unclear and unconvincing whether most of these returns have been voluntary, challenging its legality. However, due to the technicality in which it does not consider Syrians as refugees, Turkey seems to have escaped accountability for these deportations. Furthermore, in 2019, Turkey announced its intentions to repatriate and resettle one million refugees in Syrian border territories; to make return possible, Turkey has planned to create extensive infrastructure and redevelopment projects, creating so-called safe-zones at its borders, which it controls with the US and Kurdish forces. These projects have led to military incursions into Northern Syria, already making space for the resettlement of about 61,000 Syrians as of 2020.

In 2021, the Syrian Observer reported progress on these developments, with 50,000 of a planned 100,000 housing units already constructed in these zones. While these safe zones do have a clear purpose in Turkey's approach to refugee management, they are also instrumental in its foreign policy, serving as buffer zones to the Kurdish forces and preventing additional territorial gain for the Kurds that could lead to an independent state. Prioritizing its foreign affairs and refugee policy gains, Turkey continues to push a repatriation agenda, though return currently remains a non-viable option that is neither safe nor sustainable. Local and global non-governmental organizations and agencies have accused Turkey of advancing demographic change in Northern Syria through its settlement project, while Erdogan maintains this is a humane and humanitarian approach in favor of the refugees (Zaharatos, 2021).

Finally, despite being faced with pushback from these agencies and some Western nations, Turkey's gatekeeping leverage has allowed it to move forward with resettlement and repatriation plans and to continue to exert diplomatic pressure on the EU (Terry, 2021).

Turkey Local Election and its Influence on Syrian Refugee Policy

In the 2019 local elections, the loss of the Istanbul mayoralty by the governing Justice and Development (AK) party was perceived as a major setback for the 'imperial presidency' of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Istanbul's new mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu (Republican People's Party, CHP), played a leading role in nurturing aversion for Syrian refugees, stating that Turkey was managing the refugees badly and that 'people are unhappy' (Halabi, 2023).

Some Turkish politicians also regard refugees as a security threat – a trend that has grown since September 2019 when the Turkish military began Operation Peace Spring in north-east Syria, with the aim of containing the Kurds and creating a 'safe zone' to which Syrian refugees could return. In the span of less than a decade, Turkey has become host to the largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2020). Currently, there are close to 3.7 million Syrians under temporary protection (SuTP) statuses with another 320,000 individuals under international protection (UNHCR, 2021).

Additionally, Turkey over the last few years has apprehended a growing number of irregular migrants, who are not accounted for by traditional durable solutions through local integration, resettlement, and repatriation. In the meantime, refugees in Turkey, especially Syrians, are by default becoming increasingly self-settled and self-integrated. The process is multifaceted, complex, and mostly driven through the acquisition of Turkish language skills, interaction with local community members, sending their children to Turkish schools, inter-marriages, and employment. According to world refugee and migration council research report in 2021, the performance of the Turkish economy is unstable and demand-driven in its growth. The economic picture has been further aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

It is estimated that currently 3.3 million workers in Turkey earn the minimum wage and that 4.1 million workers earn less than the minimum wage, excluding Syrian refugees for whom no comparable data exist. Formal jobs are more difficult for the workers with relatively lower skill sets to secure, such as young people, women, and Syrian refugees, who face additional restrictions such as meeting residency requirements and obtaining degree equivalence.

They also mentioned in this report, between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey's Syria policy over the years (Tsarouhas, 2023).

Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government's Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey's military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington's support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. A strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad's regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Turkey. Turkey involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara's policies toward both Syria and the EU (Terry, 2021).

Overall, Ankara's involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country's image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has

used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country's 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena (Karakas, et. al. 2023)

Turkey has been active in the Syrian refugee crisis and its decision to open its borders to refugees from that nation became well known worldwide. A decade later, 3.64 million Syrian refugees are officially registered in the country (UNHCR 2021) and questions arising from the current situation are multiple. The analysis shows that Turkey's approach to the Syrian Refugee Crisis has clearly changed, influenced by a combination of internal political demands, geopolitical changes, and security concerns. Turkey has implemented securitization measures, such as tighter border restrictions and increased intelligence gathering, in response to increased terrorist threats originating from its refugee population. Additionally, Turkey's strategy for handling refugee flows has been shaped by its changing foreign policy goals, particularly its engagement in the dynamics of the Syrian crisis. Tensions in the region have increased as a result of Turkey's tense relations with its neighbors due to these geopolitical reasons. The refugee crisis has sparked political disputes and policy reforms on the inside; in an effort to ease internal tensions, the government has launched measures for resettlement and repatriation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Turkey has faced humanitarian difficulties as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis, but it has also had significant political and security ramifications. Turkey's response to the crisis has been shaped by changes in both its foreign and domestic political policies, as well as the conflict's changing dynamics. Turkey's reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis is characterized by a complex interplay between humanitarian concerns and geopolitical realities, as seen by the securitization of the refugee issue, changes in regional relations, and the impact on domestic political dynamics.

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